Military deception

Military deception (MILDEC) is an attempt by a military unit to gain an advantage during warfare by misleading adversary decision makers into taking action or inaction that creates favorable conditions for the deceiving force.^[1]^[2] This is usually achieved by creating or amplifying an artificial fog of war via psychological operations, information warfare, visual deception, or other methods.^[3] As a form of disinformation, it overlaps with psychological warfare.^[4] Military deception is also closely connected to operations security (OPSEC) in that OPSEC attempts to conceal from the adversary critical information about an organization's capabilities, activities, limitations, and intentions, or provide a plausible alternate explanation for the details the adversary can observe, while deception reveals false information in an effort to mislead the adversary.^[5]

Deception in warfare dates back to early history.^[6] The Art of War, an ancient Chinese military treatise, emphasizes the importance of deception as a way for outnumbered forces to defeat larger adversaries.^[7] Examples of deception in warfare can be found in ancient Egypt,^[8] Greece,^[9] and Rome,^[10] the Medieval Age,^[11] the Renaissance,^[12] and the European Colonial Era.^[13] Deception was employed during World War I and came into even greater prominence during World War II.^[14] In modern times, the militaries of several nations have evolved deception tactics, techniques and procedures into fully fledged doctrine.^[15]^[16]^[17]

^ Caddell 2004, p. 1.
^ Friedman, Herb. "Deception and Disinformation". Psy Warrior.com. Mechanicsburg, PA: Ed Rouse. Retrieved 7 October 2020.
^ Caddell 2004, pp. 2–3.
^ Friedman.
^ U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (26 February 2019). FM 3–13.4: Army Support to Military Deception (PDF). Washington, DC: U.S. Army Publishing Directorate. pp. 2–8. Archived from the original (PDF) on 10 October 2020. Retrieved 7 October 2020.
^ Baker, Richard (17 November 2011). "The lost and found art of deception". Army.mil. Washington, DC.
^ Petraeus, David (26 March 2018). "'The Art of War': As relevant now as when it was written". The Irish Times. Dublin, Ireland.
^ Malin, Cameron H.; Gudaitis, Terry; Holt, Thomas J.; Kilger, Max (2017). Deception in the Digital Age. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. p. xix. ISBN 978-0-1241-1639-9 – via Google Books.
^ Krentz, Peter (2009). Van Wees, Hans (ed.). War and Violence in Ancient Greece: Deception in Archaic and Classical Greek Warfare. Swansea, Wales: Classical Press of Wales. p. 169. ISBN 978-1-9105-8929-8 – via Google Books.
^ Sheldon, Rose Mary (2005). Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome. New York: Routledge. p. 129. ISBN 978-0-2030-0556-9 – via Google Books.
^ Titterton, James William (27 June 2019). Abstract: Trickery and Deception in Medieval Warfare, c. 1000 – c. 1330. White Rose eTheses Online (phd). Leeds, England: University of Leeds.
^ Greenspan, Stephen (2009). Annals of Gullibility. Westport, CT: Praeger. p. 51. ISBN 978-0-313-36216-3 – via Google Books.
^ Macknik, Stephen L.; Martinez-Conde, Susana (1 March 2017). "Deploying Deception on the Battlefield". Scientific American. London: Springer Nature America, Inc.
^ Ragucci, Jason (30 November 2015). "Good luck, Charlie". Army.mil. Washington, DC.
^ Combined Arms Center, p. iii.
^ Director Joint Force Development (26 January 2012). Joint Publication 3–13.4: Military Deception (PDF). Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. p. xiii.
^ Hamilton, David L. (1986). Deception in Soviet military doctrine and operations (PDF). Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. p. 3.

[FOOTNOTECaddell20041-1] Caddell 2004, p. 1.

[2] Friedman, Herb. "Deception and Disinformation". Psy Warrior.com. Mechanicsburg, PA: Ed Rouse. Retrieved 7 October 2020.

[FOOTNOTECaddell20042–3-3] Caddell 2004, pp. 2–3.

[FOOTNOTEFriedman-4] Friedman.

[5] U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (26 February 2019). FM 3–13.4: Army Support to Military Deception (PDF). Washington, DC: U.S. Army Publishing Directorate. pp. 2–8. Archived from the original (PDF) on 10 October 2020. Retrieved 7 October 2020.

[6] Baker, Richard (17 November 2011). "The lost and found art of deception". Army.mil. Washington, DC.

[7] Petraeus, David (26 March 2018). "'The Art of War': As relevant now as when it was written". The Irish Times. Dublin, Ireland.

[8] Malin, Cameron H.; Gudaitis, Terry; Holt, Thomas J.; Kilger, Max (2017). Deception in the Digital Age. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. p. xix. ISBN 978-0-1241-1639-9 – via Google Books.

[9] Krentz, Peter (2009). Van Wees, Hans (ed.). War and Violence in Ancient Greece: Deception in Archaic and Classical Greek Warfare. Swansea, Wales: Classical Press of Wales. p. 169. ISBN 978-1-9105-8929-8 – via Google Books.

[10] Sheldon, Rose Mary (2005). Intelligence Activities in Ancient Rome. New York: Routledge. p. 129. ISBN 978-0-2030-0556-9 – via Google Books.

[11] Titterton, James William (27 June 2019). Abstract: Trickery and Deception in Medieval Warfare, c. 1000 – c. 1330. White Rose eTheses Online (phd). Leeds, England: University of Leeds.

[12] Greenspan, Stephen (2009). Annals of Gullibility. Westport, CT: Praeger. p. 51. ISBN 978-0-313-36216-3 – via Google Books.

[13] Macknik, Stephen L.; Martinez-Conde, Susana (1 March 2017). "Deploying Deception on the Battlefield". Scientific American. London: Springer Nature America, Inc.

[14] Ragucci, Jason (30 November 2015). "Good luck, Charlie". Army.mil. Washington, DC.

[FOOTNOTECombined_Arms_Centeriii-15] Combined Arms Center, p. iii.

[16] Director Joint Force Development (26 January 2012). Joint Publication 3–13.4: Military Deception (PDF). Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. p. xiii.

[17] Hamilton, David L. (1986). Deception in Soviet military doctrine and operations (PDF). Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. p. 3.

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